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Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empirical 
questions concerning the use of emission standards. We find that the Becker result (“maximal fine / 
minimal inspection”) does not hold if we include rule making, implementation and enforcement costs 
into the model. There is a balance between the fine and the inspection variables. Making enforcement 
more stringent does not mean to put the fine levels as high as possible and only then increase the 
inspections. We have also shown that is extremely important to have correct estimates of people’s 
willingness to pay for environmental improvement. These WTP estimates determine in great part the 
optimal environmental strategy and its associated optimal monitoring and enforcement policy. 
Moreover, it really pays off to optimise the monitoring and enforcement strategy associated with an 
emission standard. This optimisation does not necessarily mean that monitoring and enforcement 
should be as stringent as possible. It is often possible to obtain the desired result by some 
intermediate value of the monitoring and enforcement parameters. This is due to the balancing of 
costs and benefits associated with monitoring and enforcement. 
 
JEL codes: K32 Environmental Law; K42 Illegal behaviour and the Enforcement of Law 
                                                      
1 We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the ‘Steunpunt Milieubeleidswetenschappen’ funded 
by the Flemish government.  Moreover we would also like to thank Stef Proost for his useful comments.    
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally many economists have been promoting market-based instruments (such as emission 
taxes) over emission standards for reasons of cost effectiveness (Field, 1994; Bohm and Russell, 
1985). However, in practice environmental policy consists mainly of command-and-control 
regulation. Generally it is believed that this observation can be explained by, among others, the 
existence of transaction costs, monitoring and enforcement costs, the influence of lobbying or the 
importance of other policy objectives (such as distributional considerations or political feasibility). In 
this paper we concentrate on emission standards and consider the importance of transaction costs and 
incomplete compliance. In Billiet et al. (2002) and Rousseau and Proost (2002) we show empirically 
that emission taxes can, under certain circumstances, be more expensive than emission standards 
when we take all associated costs into account. 
In Billiet et al. (2002) we discuss the importance of the design of emission standards. Emission 
standards are generally thought of as being inflexible with respect to firm heterogeneity. However, 
some margin of flexibility is proper to all emission standards. Emissions standards determine which 
amount of emission reduction should be achieved but they do not specify how firms have to reduce 
their emissions (Russell and Powell, 1996). Additional flexibility can be achieved by the formulation 
of the standard. Moreover we include information, monitoring and enforcement costs in our analysis. 
Using a case study we show the immense importance of the monitoring and enforcement strategy. 
Choosing the optimal level of the parameters is crucial for the choice of policy instruments.  
We limit our analysis to one specific type of emission standards; i.e. the emission standard combined 
with a documentation duty, a notification duty and an administrative fine. The emission standard is 
expressed as a concentration measure (mg/l) for waste water. The documentation duty forces firms to 
keep a paper record of their emissions. The notification duty implies that firms report these emission 
records to the government. 
Using the case study of water pollution in the textile industry of Flanders (Belgium), we discuss three 
empirical questions concerning the use of emission standards. Firstly, given a particular emission 
standard and the willingness to pay (WTP) for an environmental improvement, which monitoring and 
enforcement policy provides us with the highest welfare? Secondly, given the WTP, which 
combination of an emission standard and a monitoring and enforcement strategy gives the highest 
welfare level? Thirdly, if one wants to attain a certain level of emissions, which combination of an 
emission standard and a monitoring and enforcement strategy maximises welfare? 
In section 2 we describe the theoretical framework. In section 3 we focus on the case study and in 
section 4 we discuss its results. In section 5 we conclude. 
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II. THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
Using a static partial equilibrium framework we define the behaviour of and the costs for two types 
of agents in the economy: firms and government. Each agent has a specific objective function. The 
environmental regulation and the associated enforcement policy determine the feasible options. The 
problem is one of asymmetric information since the abatement costs are known to the firms but not to 
the regulator.   
For the government there are three stages in selecting an environmental policy: the rule-making 
stage, the implementation stage and the enforcement stage. This succession of stages is called the 
regulatory chain. In the rule-making stage the government chooses how to reduce or even solve the 
environmental pollution problem. Administrations and interest groups are consulted in order to help 
deciding on the environmental goals and on the instruments used to attain those goals. Costs linked to 
this stage are called rule-making costs. In the implementation stage the environmental regulation is in 
force and in order to ensure its correct implementation some extra regulation is needed. This 
supplementary regulation often concerns the gathering of information about the implementation and 
its transfer to the government. Costs linked to this stage are abatement costs and implementation 
costs. In the enforcement stage compliance with the regulation is ensured. A monitoring and 
enforcement policy is developed. Costs linked to this stage are the enforcement costs. For a more 
detailed study of the legal and administrative process we refer to Billiet (2001).  
The government determines its environmental regulation by setting an emission standard and an 
appropriate monitoring and enforcement policy while taking as given the behaviour of firms. 
Government will want to maximise social welfare.  It has to make choices with regard to the design 
of each instrument: the emission standard, the documentation duty, the notification duty and the 
administrative fine. We assume that the government can commit to its policy choices.  
Firms minimise their expected costs after the government has fixed the environmental policy and has 
decided on the monitoring and enforcement policy. All firms incur costs of gathering information 
about the exact legal requirements and about the description, effects and costs of all possible 
abatement technologies. Only after gathering and analysing these data, firms will decide whether to 
comply with the new regulation or not. Firms will minimise the expected costs associated with the 
environmental regulation in force. These costs include abatement costs, rule-making costs, 
implementation costs, expected enforcement costs  and the expected sanction for violating the 
standard.  
In the following sections we discuss the behaviour of the different agents in greater detail. 
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Firms 
Firms have to make at most two decisions with respect to their discharge strategy. First they have to 
decide whether to comply or not with a given emission standard. Next they have to decide what 
abatement technology to use and the amount of emissions to discharge.  
Firm i minimises the expected costs associated with the environmental regulation in force. These 
costs include abatement costs (ACi ), rule-making costs (RCf ), implementation costs (ICf ), expected 
enforcement costs ( and
i f ii F f p EC p y EC ) and the expected sanction (pi.Fi ). Some of these costs 
are identical for all firms and are marked with the index f. There are n firms in our model.  f
Formally firm i faces the following optimisation problem
2: 
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Firms discharge an amount of emissions Ei equal to the difference between initial emissions  and 
the firm’s total emission reduction EA
0
i E
i. These emissions are subject to an emission standard E .  
The rule-making, implementation and expected enforcement costs are identical for all firms. These 
costs include, among others, the contributions to federations or the costs of the firms’ extra 
administration. Managers need to be informed about their legal obligations and the implications for 
their company. Moreover they need to collect information about the technological possibilities to 
comply with the standard. Measurement of emissions is also necessary to evaluate the compliance 
status. Enforcement costs of firms consist of two parts: inspection costs ( f EC ) and sanctioning costs 
( ). The inspection costs are incurred every time an inspection is performed on the firms’ 
premises. Examples of these costs are the costs of having to follow up the inspection and to perform 
a second test if necessary. Sanctioning costs are only relevant if firms are actually fined. Examples 
f EC
                                                      
2 We assume that firms are risk neutral. This is no trivial assumption when it comes to enforcement. 
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are costs of legal representation and court costs. A detailed identification and estimation of these 
costs can be found in Billiet et al (2002). 
When the firm is violating the environmental policy, it faces an expected sanction piFi ; where pi is 
the inspection frequency and Fi is the fine. The fine depends on the size of the violation and the 


















  (2) 
Every firm, whether it is violating the environmental regulation or not, will be inspected with a 
certain fixed probability p . A violator, however, faces an extra possibility of being inspected on top 
of this fixed probability. This violation-dependent or variable probability is proportional to the level 
of violation. This does not imply that the agency knows the level of violation or even which firms are 
in violation. It simply represents the practice that every complaint is followed up by the 
environmental inspection agency. The neighbouring community, environmental pressure groups or 
civil servants can issue complaints when they notice something suspicious. We assume that 
complaints are highly correlated with the degree of violation. Moreover, we assume that every 
violation that is detected leads to a conviction. In other words, there are no measurement errors or 
uncertainties present. The administrative fine we use is a function of the level of violation. Finally we 
assume that firms know the relation between the level of violation, the probability of inspection and 
the sanction. 
Firms decide which abatement technology to install based on a very simple decision rule: they install 
technology   if total costs are smaller with that technology than without. If more than one 
technology or technology combination gives a costs reduction, the technology with the highest cost 
reduction is chosen. Abatement will lead to a cost reduction for the firm if the difference in expected 
fines and expected enforcement costs with and without abatement exceeds the investment costs. We 
cannot derive general first-order conditions since our abatement cost functions are step-functions and 
firm specific. Nevertheless we can derive a firm-dependent decision rule. Firm i will choose 
technology   or  
j 
j 
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Without abatement firms have initial emissions equal to  . Installing abatement technology 
o
i E j   
allows them to reduce their emissions by  . Once the abatement decision is taken, actual 
emissions E
i ij Eab 
i are determined as the difference between initial and abated emissions. The abatement 
decision also determines the degree of firm violation. Notice that due to the indivisibilities in the 
abatement cost function, firms can overcomply with the regulation. The extra emission reductions 
benefit society but not the firms.  
 
Government 
Given the behaviour of firms, the government determines its environmental regulation by setting an 
emission standard and an appropriate monitoring and enforcement policy. It has to make choices with 
regard to the design of each instrument: the emission standard (e.g. the choice of unit and value), the 
documentation duty (e.g. the profile in time of a measurement and registration obligation), the 
notification duty (e.g. the frequency level of notification) and the administrative fine (e.g. the degree 
of flexibility of the fining amount). We assume that the emission standard is expressed in milligram 
per litre (mg/l). The documentation duty forces firms to keep a paper record of their emissions by 
monthly sampling. Once a year firms will report these emission records to the government. The 
expression for the administrative fine is found in equation (2). 
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Social welfare consists of producer (PS) and consumer (CS) surplus, environmental quality (EQ), 
regulatory costs for firms and the governmental budgetary surplus corrected with the marginal cost of 
public funds (MCPF). We assume that the marginal cost of public funds equals one. 
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In the global welfare function we include all rule-making, implementation and enforcement costs 
associated with a particular set of instruments but also subtract environmental benefits. 
Environmental benefits are subtracted to allow us to deal with the indivisibilities of the abatement 
costs that make comparisons across instruments more difficult (Oates et al., 1989). 
Rule-making costs for the government result from meetings within the administration and with 
interest groups and experts. Governmental implementation costs have to do with, for instance, 
distributing regulatory information through official publication of laws and statutes. Enforcement 
costs include inspection and prosecution costs. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL  ILLUSTRATION 
Benchmark and description 
In order to illustrate our theoretical model we focus on the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). 
More specifically we concentrate on the water pollution caused by textile improvement and carpet 
production. These two subsectors are, after all, responsible for most of the water pollution in the 
sector. Several sector studies (PRESTI, 1994-1997; Jacobs et al., 1998; Centexbel, 1996 and OVAM, 
1996) provide us with useful information. For reasons of tractability we limit our study to water 
pollution caused by BOD emissions and we only consider point sources.  
In our benchmark scenario there is no environmental regulation in place. We do, however, assume 
that all necessary legal and economic institutions are already in place; such as the environmental 
inspection agency, courts, senate…  
 
Abatement cost function 
We explicitly model the firms’ heterogeneity to capture the advantages – with respect to cost 
effectiveness – of market-based versus command-and-control instruments. Therefore we made use of 
a firm level survey on abatement costs. We first contacted by mail 106 Flemish companies active in 
textile improvement and carpet production. Then we conducted a follow-up interview on site. We 
obtained useful cost estimates from about 20 firms. We asked firms to state the costs of presently 
installed abatement technologies and of planned investments in the next two years. These data were 
used to estimate abatement cost functions for each company in order to represent firms’ 
heterogeneity (see Billiet et al., 2002).  
The cost estimates take both fixed and variable costs into account. We include initial investment 
costs, subsidies, personnel, energy and other costs. The life span of an investment is assumed to be 
20 years. We assign all costs to only one pollutant, i.e. BOD, and therefore assume that the sole 
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purpose of the investment is to reduce BOD emissions
3. After calculating the net present value 
(NPV) of each technology we derive the associated annuities and use these in the model. 
An extensive range of technologies was reported including filters, use of different inputs and 
wastewater treatment. Cost differences of abatement technologies between firms turn out to be large 
indeed; cost estimates (NPV) for one particular technology ranged from 1 million € in one firm to 4.7 
million € in another firm.  
 
Rule-making, implementation and enforcement costs 
We identified cost factors that resulted from the legal context and from the instrument itself (see 
Billiet et al., 2002). For each of these cost factors we performed a relative valuation per instrument 
and per agent; and we took into account the different stages of the regulatory chain. We included a 
wide variety of costs: the costs of lobbying, filling in forms, communicating with the administration, 
performing inspections, internal meetings, legal counselling…  (see table 1) 
 
Emission standard  Firm Government 
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Table 1: Rule making, implementation and enforcement costs 
                                                      
3 In reality investments in abatement technologies often serve multiple purpose and reduce the output of several 
pollutants. This means that firms can ‘overachieve’ and do better than legally required. One way to deal with 
this overachievement problem can be found in Oates et al. (1989). In this paper firms gain noting by 
overachieving although society does through the improvement of water quality. 
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The rule making, implementation and enforcement costs were estimated using the firm survey, by 
checking court rulings and by interviewing experts in the administration and in the law profession.  
These costs (see Billiet et al., 2002) are not used as such in the model. We have estimated and taken 
into account how often a particular instrument is used or changed by government, how often firms 
are punished for being violators, etc. Costs associated with an emission standard are assumed to 
occur every four years and we, therefore, use the initial estimate divided by five (we look at a time 
period of 20 years). Costs associated with inspections depend on the number of inspections 
performed.  
In order to show how much these rule making, implementation and enforcement costs weigh on the 
results, we represent the costs for firms and government in figure 1. We give the firm costs excluding 
abatement costs and including abatement costs and government costs as a percentage of the change in 
social welfare for different specifications of the emission standard. We take the monitoring and 







50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700


































It is immediately clear that the costs for firms, including abatement costs, are much higher than for 
the government. Even if we do not include abatement costs, costs for firms are still at least twice as 
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high as for the government (see figure in appendix). Moreover we also notice that the amount of rule 
making, implementation and enforcement costs decrease substantially if the standard becomes less 
stringent. It is obvious from looking at the costs for firms with and without abatement costs, that the 
abatement costs constitutes the largest part of the costs. If the standard becomes more stringent, the 
abatement costs increase significantly, while the increase in other firm costs and government costs is 
much lower (see appendix).  




We have calculated the results with the GAMS software package and Microsoft Excel. In order to 
limit the number of possibilities somewhat we made the following assumptions. The emission 
standard (E  or ebar) can attain all values between 0 and 660 that are products of 20. The fixed 
emission frequency ( p or pbar) and the variable inspection parameter (α) can equal all values 
between 0 and 1 that are products of 0.1. The sanction parameter (π) can take all values between 0 
and 5 that are products of 0.5. These limitations still provide us with over 45000 different regulatory 
combinations. 
We want to investigate the way to maximise social welfare under different circumstances. We start 
with three different scenario’s: firstly both the emission standard and the willingness to pay (WTP) 
for an environmental improvement are given, secondly only the WTP is given and thirdly, an 
emission target is given. We then maximise social welfare by optimising the remaining parameters. 
These parameters always include the monitoring and enforcement parameters ( , p and α π ). 
Depending on the scenario the emission standard E  is also a policy variable. 
Before we discuss the results, we want to stress that the results depend greatly on the model’s 
assumptions. Therefore they should not be taken too literally. What is important, is the intuition they 
reveal not the numbers themselves. 
  
WTP and E  given 
Firstly, we take an existing emission standard, 260 mg BOD/l, as given and we want to optimise the 
monitoring and enforcement policy designed by the regulator. Our results (see figure 2 and the 
appendix for the exact numbers) show that this optimal policy depends crucially on the willingness to 
pay (WTP) for the removal of one ton BOD. Depending on the monitoring and enforcement strategy 
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and thus on the WTP, different levels of BOD emissions are reached. In our example, they can vary 
between 12 and 37 million ton BOD.  
We find that for very low values of the WTP, it is not worthwhile to enforce the emission standard. 
This is what we intuitively would expect. When people do not care about water quality, it does not 
pay for the government to invest in enforcing environmental regulation. The environmental benefit 













































































pbar alfa pi emissions
 Figure 2: Results for given WTP and E = 260 mg/l 
Moreover, we notice that the penalty parameter never equals its highest possible value, i.e. 5. This is 
partly due to our assumption that, for equal levels of social welfare
4, the lowest value of the 
parameter under consideration is taken. We assume that the lower the penalty, the more easily it is 
implemented and/or the less it costs. This result refines the well-known result of Becker (1968). 
Becker claims that the fine should be set as high as possible and the probability of detection should 
be as low as possible in order to obtain a given level of deterrence at the lowest cost. This result 
depends crucially on the assumption of being able to levy fines at zero cost. However, in this paper, 
we do assume that levying fines involves costs for society as well as for the targeted firm. These 
costs include, among others, costs for legal representation, possible court costs, administrative costs 
                                                      
4 It is possible that several – different – monitoring and enforcement policies give the same overall welfare. For 
example, if the WTP equals 12 Euro, then welfare is the same for both π equal to four and π equal to five.   
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and time costs. The results of this model are therefore closer to reality since we do not observe 
maximum fines for all offences. 
We also see that the stringency of the monitoring and enforcement policy increases with increasing 
WTP. If people are willing to pay more for a cleaner environment, it pays for the government to 
enforce an emission standard more seriously. More stringent monitoring and enforcement leads, after 
all, to lower BOD emissions and therefore higher social welfare. Notice that both the inspection and 
the fine variables increase with a more stringent policy. This confirms our result that monitoring and 
enforcement are complementary tools for an effective policy.  
 
WTP given  
Suppose we only know what the willingness to pay for an improvement in water quality is. We now 
want to determine the optimal emission standard and the optimal monitoring and enforcement policy 
given this WTP. The optimal environmental regulation is the one that maximises social welfare. The 
optimal policy for a given WTP maximises the difference between the gain in environmental quality 
by increasing emission reductions and the decrease in social welfare by costs associated with the 
increase in policy stringency. The results of these calculations can be found in figure 3, figure 4 and 
the exact numbers in the appendix. If, for example, the WTP is equal to 1.4 € per ton BOD, we see 
that the highest welfare level is obtained by choosing the emission standard equal to 200 mg/l and 
selecting the monitoring and enforcement parameters such that the fixed inspection frequency (pbar) 
equals 0, the variable inspection parameter (alfa) equals 0.1 and the sanctioning parameter (pi) equals 
1.5. This will result in total BOD emissions of approximately 13.9 million ton in the economy.  
In general we see that the higher the WTP, the more stringent the environmental regulation is and the 
lower the resulting BOD emissions. When people are willing to pay for cleaner rivers, it is optimal 
for the government to design and enforce more environmental laws. As in the previous case we also 
find that it does not pay to formulate an environmental policy if the WTP for a cleaner environment 
is too low. Moreover, we can say that, in general, the more stringent the emission standard the more 
stringent the monitoring and enforcement strategy will be. 
Again we find that it is not optimal to maximise the fine and keep the inspection level as low as 
possible. Both fine level and inspection level turn out to be equivalent instruments in building an 
optimal monitoring and enforcement policy.   
This scenario clearly demonstrates the importance of knowing the willingness to pay for 
environmental improvements by the community. Estimating this WTP is no easy and clear-cut job. 
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Several techniques
5 have been developed but very few – consistent – empirical estimates exist. For 
Flanders we do not know of any study considering the willingness to pay for BOD reductions in 
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Figure 4: Monitoring and enforcement variables for given WTP 
                                                      
5 For instance, the travel cost method (TCM) or contingent valuation (CVM).  For an overview of this literature 
see, for example, Freeman (1993). 
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Emission target given 
Finally we are also able to answer the following question: if you want to obtain a certain level of 
BOD emissions, which environmental policy will give you the highest possible welfare level (see 
figure 5)? For example, if the regulator wants less than 25 million ton BOD emissions released in 
Flemish rivers by the textile industry, it should set its emission standard for that industry equal to 200 
mg/l. The associated monitoring and enforcement policy would then be  p  equal to 0, α equal to 0.1 
and π equal to 0.5 (see appendix). Figure 5 shows only part of the results. The complete results can 
be found in appendix. 
Again we see that the more emissions the regulator wants to reduce, the more stringent the 
environmental policy it should set. This confirms our intuition. However the relation is not 
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Figure 5 
An emission reduction target is selected up front and can be influenced by the WTP but this is not 
necessarily so. We would also like to point out that overachievement by firms is valued at the WTP. 
If firms abate more than required, the extra emission reductions are valued as an increase in social 
welfare.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have shown that the Becker result (“maximal fine / minimal inspection”) does not 
hold if we include rule making, implementation and enforcement costs into the model. We find that 
there is a balance between the fine and the inspection variables. Making enforcement more stringent 
does not mean to put the fine levels as high as possible and only then increase the inspections. Both 
inspections and fines are increased at the same time. This is an important result as it refines one of 
the most important results in law & economics literature.   
We have also shown that is extremely important to have correct estimates of people’s willingness to 
pay for environmental improvement. These WTP estimates determine in great part the optimal 
environmental strategy and its associated optimal monitoring and enforcement policy. If the WTP is 
very low, the costs of implementing environmental regulation are not fully compensated by the 
corresponding environmental improvement. However, the higher the WTP for emission reductions, 
the more it pays to develop more stringent environmental regulation (emission standard plus 
monitoring and enforcement policy). 
Moreover, it really pays off to optimise the monitoring and enforcement strategy associated with an 
emission standard. This optimisation does not necessarily mean that monitoring and enforcement 
should be as stringent as possible. It is often possible to obtain the desired result by some 
intermediate value of the monitoring and enforcement parameters. This is due to the balancing of 
costs and benefits associated with monitoring and enforcement. 
 
APPENDIX 
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B.  Results for given WTP and E  
 
WTP €/ton  BOD  Ebar  pbar  alfa pi  Emissions 
between and  (mg/l)      (ton  BOD) 
0  0.23860  260  0  0  0  37 089 413 
0.23861  0.73915  260  0  0.1  0.5  32 060 321 
0.73916  3.80326  260  0.1  0  2  16 958 181 
3.80327  5.04379  260  0.1  0  3  13 930 028 
5.04380  11.50658  260  0.2  0  3  12 668 667 
11.50659    260  0  0.3  4  12 250 297 
 
C. Results for given WTP 
 
WTP €/ton  BOD ebar  Pbar  alfa  Pi  Emissions 
between  and  (mg/l)      (ton  BOD) 
0.00000  0.07831  - 0 0 0  37  089  413 
0.07832  0.25087  440  0  0.1  1.5  34 132 318 
0.25088  0.34782  320  0  0.1  0.5  28 322 988 
0.34783  1.05290  300  0  0.1  0.5  27 677 109 
1.05291  1.85843  200  0  0.1  1.5  13 894 641 
1.85844  2.13635  160  0.1  0  1  12 786 423 
2.13636  3.75988  80  0.1 0 1.5  10  659  359 
3.75989  6.12461  60  0.1  0  2  7 273 985 
6.12462  11.87103  60  0.1  0  3  6 012 624 
11.87104  18.38123  40  0.1  0  5  5 718 244 
18.38124    60  0.2 0 3.5  5  597  254 
 
D. Results for given emission target 
 
emissions Ebar  pbar alfa  pi  emissions ebar pbar alfa  Pi 
37 089 413  -  0  0  0  18 324 070 320  0.1  0  4 
36 989 154  580  0  0.3  4.5  18 200 080 320  0  0.2  4 
36 965 424  540  0  0.4  5  18 030 083 300  0.1  0  3.5 
36 565 105  460  0.1  0  0.5  17 906 094 300  0  0.2  3 
36 441 116  460  0  0.2  4.5  16 970 059 100  0.1  0  0.5 
34 132 318  440  0  0.1  1.5  16 958 181 220  0.1  0  1 
34 008 328  440  0  0.2  4  16 938 719 320  0  0.3  5 
33 796 625  460  0.2  0  4  16 644 733 300  0  0.3  4 
33 444 732  460  0.2  0  4.5  16 644 339 320  0  0.6  5 
32 706 201  180  0.1  0  0.5  16 350 353 300  0  0.5  4.5 
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32 060 321  280  0  0.1  0.5  13 930 028 280  0.1  0  4 
31 899 889  460  0.2  0  5  13 894 641 200  0  0.1  1.5 
31 487 827  360  0  0.1  3.5  13 806 038 220  0  0.1  2.5 
31 363 837  400  0  0.2  4.5  13 542 748 60  0.1  0  0.5 
31 135 934  340  0  0.1  3  12 786 423 160  0.1  0  1 
31 011 945  360  0  0.1  4.5  12 668 667 240  0.1  0  5 
29 591 090  340  0  0.1  3.5  12 544 677 240  0  0.1  5 
29 470 350  460  0.2  0.6  5  12 250 297 240  0  0.2  5 
29 467 101  360  0  0.1  5  10 866 488 200  0.1  0  2.5 
29 415 830  280  0  0.1  1  10 742 498 200  0  0.1  2 
28 322 988  320  0  0.1  0.5  10 659 359 80  0.1  0  1.5 
27 870 987  260  0  0.1  1  10 514 595 160  0  0.1  1 
27 677 109  300  0  0.1  0.5  10 390 605 180  0  0.1  1.5 
27 161 552  400  0.1  0  3  10 110 163 200  0.1  0  3 
27 037 563  340  0  0.1  4  9 758 270  160  0.1  0  2 
26 442 197  460  0.7  0  5  9 634 281  120  0  0.1  1 
25 678 498  320  0  0.1  2  9 605 127  200  0  0.6  0.5 
25 441 448  280  0  0.1  1.5  9 481 138  200  0  0.1  3.5 
25 317 459  280  0  0.1  3  9 253 234  180  0  0.5  0.5 
25 032 618  300  0  0.1  1.5  9 186 757  200  0  0.2  3 
24 807 447  200  0  0.1  0.5  9 129 245  180  0  0.1  2.5 
24 222 933  140  0.1  0  0.5  8 848 802  200  0.1  0  4.5 
24 133 399  340  0.1  0  5  8 834 864  180  0  0.1  4.5 
24 009 409  340  0  0.3  4  8 724 813  200  0.1  0.1  2.5 
23 781 761  320  0  0.1  2.5  8 496 909  180  0.1  0  4 
23 487 775  300  0.1  0  1  8 430 432  200  0.1  0.1  3.5 
22 748 049  360  0  0.6  5  8 372 920  160  0  0.1  2.5 
22 716 986  440  0.8  0.5  5  8 078 540  160  0  0.1  3.5 
22 453 668  340  0  0.8  5  7 631 205  140  0.1  0  3 
22 413 295  280  0.1  0  3.5  7 273 985  60  0.1  0  2 
22 377 909  200  0  0.1  1  6 369 845  140  0.1  0  3.5 
22 289 306  280  0  0.1  4.5  6 245 855  80  0  0.1  1 
22 026 016  180  0  0.1  0.5  6 075 464  100  0.2  0  3 
21 352 223  320  0  0.1  3  6 012 624  60  0.1  0  3 
21 228 233  320  0  0.1  3.5  5 951 475  120  0  0.1  3.5 
21 058 236  300  0  0.1  2  5 888 635  60  0  0.1  0.5 
21 027 945  280  0  0.2  4.5  5 718 244  40  0.1  0  5 
20 934 247  300  0  0.1  3  5 594 254  60  0.2  0  3.5 
20 733 565  280  0  0.4  4           
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